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By George A. Kahn
O
ver the last quarter century, the U.S. economy has faced a 
number of financial shocks originating in a variety of sectors 
and locations around the globe. These shocks include the 
high-tech stock market crash, the Asian financial crisis, the Russian 
debt default, and most recently, the U.S. housing price collapse and 
subsequent global financial crisis. While the U.S. economy weathered 
most of these shocks with little or no impact on economic activity, it 
fell into its worst recession since the Great Depression as a result of the 
2008 global financial crisis. 
The causes of these crises are as diverse as the nature of the crises 
themselves. To some extent, however, a buildup of financial imbalances 
preceded each crisis. In some cases, asset prices rose to unsustainable 
levels inconsistent with market fundamentals. In other cases, a buildup 
of foreign debt precipitated a currency crisis. A key question for policy-
makers is whether policy actions taken in the period leading up to the 
crisis leaned against, or contributed to, the building imbalances. In par-
ticular, did monetary policies targeting stable inflation and sustainable 
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long-term economic growth inadvertently exacerbate these imbalances 
by keeping policy-controlled interest rates too low for too long? 
Answering this question requires first defining what “too low for 
too long” means. This article uses deviations from systematic or rule-
like behavior in the setting of policy rates as an indicator of whether 
policy was too easy or, for that matter, too tight. In particular, devia-
tions are measured as departures from various versions of the Taylor 
rule, which prescribes a systematic setting for the policy rate based on 
inflation relative to an inflation target and real output relative to poten-
tial output. Such deviations—especially if they are small and tempo-
rary—may represent an appropriate and desirable response to unusual 
economic or financial conditions. Larger and more persistent devia-
tions, however, may contribute to a buildup of financial imbalances. 
A second issue that must be addressed to determine whether mon-
etary policy contributed to financial imbalances is to define what is 
meant by an imbalance. In this article, an imbalance is defined as a 
persistent deviation in an asset price or other financial variable from its 
long-run historical trend. A variety of empirical measures of imbalances 
are identified in four broad areas—housing markets, stock prices, lever-
age, and commodity prices. While each measure is an imprecise indica-
tor of a particular imbalance, collectively they may provide insight into 
the relationship of Taylor rule deviations to building pressures in key 
sectors of the economy.
The article concludes that, while there does appear to be statis-
tically significant relationships between Taylor rule deviations and a 
number of financial indicators, their economic significance is mixed. 
The strongest and most robust relationship is between house price in-
dicators and Taylor rule deviations. In other cases, the relationship is 
economically weak and sometimes goes in the wrong direction in the 
sense that interest rates below the prescription of the Taylor rule are as-
sociated with smaller rather than larger imbalances. The fragility of the 
results likely stems from the inherent difficulty of identifying financial 
imbalances, combined with the irregular emergence of imbalances in 
different sectors at different times.  
The first section of the article describes how deviations from sys-
tematic policy are measured and identifies episodes over the last 25 years 
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these deviations may have contributed to financial imbalances. The third 
section provides evidence on the relationship between deviations in poli-
cy from rule-like behavior and the buildup of financial imbalances. 
I.	 TAYLOR	RULE	DEVIATIONS
The Taylor rule has become a key guidepost for monetary policy 
at the Federal Reserve and other central banks (Asso, Kahn, and Lee-
son). While there are many specifications of the Taylor rule, virtually 
all of them—to varying degrees—characterize monetary policy as too 
accommodative from 2003 to 2006. 
The Taylor rule as a normative guide to policy
Since the mid-1980s, Federal Reserve monetary policy has con-
formed fairly closely and systematically to simple rules relating the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) target for the federal funds 
rate to a few factors that broadly characterize the state of the economy. 
One such rule, the original Taylor rule, fit the data particularly well 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period of generally favorable 
economic performance. Because this rule also performed well in a va-
riety of macroeconomic models, keeping the volatility of inflation and 
output relatively low, the rule over time became viewed as a normative 
prescription for how policy should be set, conditional on a few current 
economic indicators.
A policy that systematically responds to economic conditions based 
on a simple rule such as the Taylor rule offers a number of advantages 
(Taylor 2008). First, it describes how policymakers should respond to 
changing economic circumstances. Second, it commits policymakers to 
achieving an inflation objective over the long run. Third, it helps poli-
cymakers communicate the rationale for, and data-dependent nature 
of, their decisions to the public. Fourth, it helps ensure that policy-
makers will take actions in the short run that are consistent with their 
long-run goals. Fifth, it reduces uncertainty about how policy rates are 
set today and in the future. And sixth, it helps the public hold policy-
makers accountable for their actions.
But there are also reasons why policy may occasionally deviate from 
systematic rules. Liquidity crises that require a temporary injection of 
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desirable to temporarily lower the policy rate below the level prescribed 
by a simple rule. Another reason for deviating from rule-like behavior 
might be a shock to the aggregate price level. Such a shock might nor-
mally call for a tightening of policy, but if the shock is seen as transi-
tory, with no impact on inflation expectations, it might not require the 
response prescribed by a rule.1 Finally, policymakers may respond to 
economic indicators other than those incorporated in the simple rule. 
In short, a simple rule may simply not capture all of the contingencies 
that might confront policymakers.2
This article examines four versions of the Taylor rule to identify 
episodes of “off-rule” behavior. The rules are normative prescriptions 
for policy that have been proposed in the economics literature, as op-
posed to rules that are estimated to fit as closely as possible the actual 
behavior of the policy rate. The rules’ prescriptions are calculated with 
the latest available vintage of data as opposed to “real-time” data; that 
is, data available to policymakers at the time decisions were made. The 
purpose of this analysis is not to identify policy mistakes, which would 
require an evaluation with real-time data, but rather to examine the 
extent to which the resulting monetary conditions—with 20/20 hind-
sight—contributed to a buildup of financial imbalances.    
All of the rules take the following general form:
it = rr* + pt + b(pt– p*) + g(yt – yt*),
where it represents the recommended policy rate as measured by the 
federal  funds  rate;  rr*  represents  the  equilibrium  real  interest  rate; 
(pt –p*) represents the deviation of the inflation rate (pt )from its long-
run target (p* ); and (yt–yt*) represents the output gap—the level of 
real GDP (yt) relative to potential GDP (y* ). With the exception of p*, 
which is assumed equal to 2 percent at an annual rate for all variations 
of the rule, all of the other parameters vary depending on the particular 
rule being examined. 
Intuitively, the rule prescribes that the federal funds rate be set 
equal to the equilibrium nominal interest rate (rr* + pt ) when inflation 
is at its target of 2 percent and real GDP is equal to potential GDP. 
When inflation deviates from target or real GDP deviates from poten-
tial, the rule prescribes that the funds rate be adjusted. In particular, the 
rule prescribes an increase in the funds rate when inflation is above the 
target or real GDP is above potential, and a decrease in the funds rate 
when inflation is below target or real GDP is below potential. 
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 Table 1 identifies the four specifications of the Taylor rule to be 
examined. Rule 1 is the original version of the Taylor rule introduced 
by John Taylor in 1993. It assumes an equal response of the policy rate 
to inflation and the output gap. Rule 2, proposed by Ball in 1997, 
places a higher weight on output than the original Taylor rule. In some 
macroeconomic models, the higher weight on output results in lower 
variation in output and inflation than the original rule. Rule 3 assumes 
a higher equilibrium real rate of 2.5 percent compared with Taylor’s 
original assumption of a 2 percent equilibrium real rate, while main-
taining Rule 2’s higher weight on the output gap. Rule 4 assumes the 
higher equilibrium real rate of Rule 3 but Rule 1’s lower weight on the 
output gap.3  
All of the rules adhere to the “Taylor principle,” which argues 
that policymakers should adjust the nominal federal funds rate more 
than one-for-one with an increase in inflation relative to target. This 
response ensures that the real rate rises when inflation goes up so that 
monetary policy leans against inflationary pressures. It also ensures that 
the inflation target is achieved over time and therefore, in theory, helps 
anchor inflation expectations at the inflation target.
The Taylor rule in practice
The Taylor rule can be used to evaluate the stance of monetary 
policy. The top panel of Chart 1 shows the historical prescriptions from 
the four specifications of the Taylor rule, along with the actual federal 
funds rate target. All of the specifications use the consumer price index 
(CPI) as the measure of inflation and the Congressional Budget Of-
fice’s (CBO) estimate of potential GDP in calculating the output gap.4   
 rr* b g
Rule 1 2 0.5 0.5
Rule 2 2 0.5 1.0
Rule 3 2.5 0.5 1.0
Rule 4 2.5 0.5 0.5
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(Appendix 1 shows the sensitivity of the Taylor rule to alternative mea-
sures of inflation.) All data are the latest vintage available.5 The shaded 
area is the envelope of Taylor rule prescriptions from the four specifica-
tions. As shown in the chart, the actual path of the funds rate closely 
follows the prescriptions of the Taylor rules from 1987 to 1997. From 
1998 to 2008, however, the funds rate fell frequently and persistently 
below the prescriptions of all of the specifications of the Taylor rule.6 
As shown in the lower panel of Chart 1, the deviations from the Taylor 
rule over this period ranged from roughly two percentage points below 
the Taylor rule prescription to roughly six percentage points, depending 
on the particular rule examined.7    
Two episodes in which the funds rate deviated persistently from 
Taylor rule prescriptions stand out. The first episode is in the period 
from late 1998 through 2000. At the beginning of this period, the Fed-
eral Reserve lowered the funds rate in response to a liquidity crisis stem-
ming from the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Russian debt default in 
1998, and finally the collapse of the Long-Term Capital Management 
hedge fund. According to the FOMC statement accompanying the first 
cut in the funds rate, “the action was taken to cushion the effects on 
prospective economic growth in the United States of increasing weak-
ness in foreign economies and of less accommodative financial condi-
tions domestically.”8 In retrospect, over this period, the U.S. economy 
expanded briskly, leading to an ex post Taylor rule prescription that 
the funds rate should be raised, not lowered. Moreover, as the FOMC 
reversed course in June 1999 and began tightening policy, it moved the 
funds rate up at a slower pace than suggested by the Taylor rule. 
The second episode occurred in 2002-06 as the economy recovered 
only gradually from the 2001 economic recession. During this period, 
the FOMC cut the funds rate to a low of 1 percent and held it there for 
a year. In doing so, the FOMC was responding to two concerns. One 
was that the unemployment rate remained high well into 2003 and real 
GDP growth was sluggish. In addition, the Committee was concerned 
that inflation was falling below desired levels. For example, real-time 
data on inflation as measured by the core personal consumption ex-
penditure price index—an inflation indicator followed closely by the 
FOMC—fell below 1 percent. Although this measure was subsequently 70  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
revised up, most Committee members viewed the real-time inflation 
rate as undesirably low. 
In late 2002 and 2003, some Committee members voiced concerns 
about a possibility, though remote, of deflation. Although the baseline 
forecasts of most models were not predicting deflation, the Commit-
tee maintained an accommodative monetary policy to limit the risk of 
deflation. In May 2003, the FOMC statement explicitly pointed to the 
risk of an “unwelcome substantial fall in inflation.” Clearly, concern 
that the United States could experience the same kind of deflationary 
episode experienced by Japan in the previous decade weighed heavily 
on policymakers’ minds. 
Not only did policymakers dramatically lower rates, they also pro-
vided explicit “forward guidance” about the likely future course of rates. 
In its August 2002 statement, the FOMC indicated risks “are weighted 
mainly toward conditions that may generate economic weakness,” in-
dicating that a future rate decrease was more likely than an increase. 
In 2003, the risk of inflation becoming undesirably low prompted the 
FOMC to provide even more direct guidance about the future path 
of the policy rate. In its August statement, the Committee indicated 
it “believes that policy accommodation can be maintained for a con-
siderable period,” suggesting that the policy rate was likely to remain 
at a historically low level for an unsually long time. Then, in January 
2004, the Committee said it “believes that it can be patient in removing 
its policy accommodation.” Finally, as the Committee contemplated 
raising its policy rate later that year, it said it “believes that policy ac-
commodation can be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured,” 
suggesting a gradual upward trajectory for the funds rate target. 
All of these statements contributed to a view among investors that 
a low level of rates relative to fundamentals would likely persist. In ret-
rospect, rates remained persistently well below the prescription of the 
Taylor rule. They potentially fostered the financing of asset purchases 
with short-term borrowing, feeding a buildup of financial imbalances. 
In addition, they may have contributed to increased leverage, greater 
risk-taking, and speculation in commodity markets.9ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  71
II.	 FINANCIAL	IMBALANCES	IN	A	LOW	INTEREST	RATE	
ENVIRONMENT
Over the last 25 years, monetary policy has been largely successful 
in achieving and maintaining a low and stable inflation rate. Inflation 
expectations have become better anchored, helping keep inflation stable 
even when monetary policy has been eased (Mishkin). However, while 
the overall price level as measured by various indexes of final goods and 
services prices has been relatively stable, various classes of asset prices 
have climbed to unsustainable levels and subsequently crashed. Has 
monetary policy, in spite of its success in controlling inflation, played 
a role in the boom–and–bust cycle of asset prices? More generally, has 
monetary policy contributed to a buildup of financial imbalances, de-
fined here as significant and sustained deviations of asset prices and 
other related economic indicators from longer-run trends?
Economists at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), among 
others, have argued that our modern financial system is inherently pro-
cyclical. For example, a liberalized financial system can create an endog-
enous cycle in which a piece of good news leads to an increase in the de-
mand for and supply of credit. Asset prices and spending rise as a result, 
further boosting optimism as well as collateral for new loans. The process 
is potentially aided by a monetary policy that focuses on inflation and 
real output and not on the financial imbalances themselves, especially if 
policy rates are low and expected to remain low. The cycle continues un-
til asset prices and credit extension exceed the levels justified by the initial 
piece of good news. Eventually, the bubble bursts, and the cycle goes into 
reverse. Asset prices fall, and deleveraging takes place (Borio and White; 
White). In the United States over the last 25 years, such boom-and-bust 
cycles have been evident in a number of markets and financial indicators, 
including stocks, housing, leverage, and commodities. 
Stock prices
One example of a boom-and-bust cycle during the last 25 years 
has been the stock market, particularly, in the high-tech sector. Ironi-
cally, the success of the Federal Reserve in responding to the 1987 stock 
market crash and the aftermath of the 1998 Asian financial crisis may 
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sented a one-way bet. In both cases, the Federal Reserve lowered interest 
rates aggressively and pumped liquidity into the banking system (Miller, 
Weller, and Zhang). The prevailing view at the Federal Reserve—articu-
lated by Chairman Greenspan himself—was that policymakers were ill-
equipped to identify or counter asset price bubbles as they are forming. 
However, monetary policy could be effectively deployed to limit the 
adverse effects of a bubble when it burst (Greenspan 2002). 
These factors may have contributed to the run-up in high-tech stock 
prices in the late 1990s. In particular, when optimism over the prospects 
for the Internet fostered large-scale investment in the high-tech sector, 
investors rushed in and pushed up high-tech stock prices. The low inter-
est rate environment in the post-1998 period contributed to a search for 
yield in general and enthusiasm for the high-tech sector in particular. 
The so-called “Greenspan put” made the investment appear to be a one- 
way bet, particularly in a low-inflation environment (Miller, Weller, and 
Zhang). From 1997 to 2000, the overall stock market as measured by 
the S&P 500 stock price index almost doubled in value, while the S&P 
tech stock price index rose almost fivefold (Chart 2).  
When prices finally collapsed in 2000-01 and the economy entered 
recession, the Fed again lowered rates. The federal funds rate target de-
clined from 6.5 percent in 2000 to 1 percent in 2003. Moreover, the 
FOMC signaled in its statements that rates would remain low, first in-
dicating that policy accommodation could be maintained for a “consid-
erable” period and then suggesting that it could be removed at a “mea-
sured” pace. This period of low rates, in turn, may have set the stage for 
another, much more severe financial crisis—the 2008 global financial 
crisis that began in the U.S. subprime mortgage market.
Housing
The recent experience in the housing market is the most obvious 
U.S. example of the boom-and-bust cycle. John Taylor has argued that 
easy monetary policy from 2003 to 2006 helped generate the boom in 
the demand for housing and the resulting run-up in housing prices. Over 
that period, the funds rate was held well below the prescription of the 
original 1993 specification of the Taylor rule. “With low money market 
rates, housing finance was very cheap and attractive—especially variable-
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jumped to a 25-year high by the end of 2003 and remained high until 
the sharp decline began in early 2006” (Taylor 2007, p. 465). 
At the same time, house prices rose rapidly (Chart 3). For example, 
according to the Federal Housing Finance Administration’s (FHFA) 
house price index, prices accelerated sharply in 2003 and increased 
at an annual rate of over 10 percent in 2005. Subsequently in 2006, 
the pace of house price increases began to slow, and in 2008 prices 
collapsed.10  In addition, the house price-to-rent ratio—a measure of 
house prices relative to fundamentals similar to a stock price-earnings 
ratio—climbed to unsustainable levels.11 The (log) ratio of the FHFA’s 
home price index to the CPI’s measure of owner’s equivalent rent in-
creased roughly 35 percent from its low in the 1990s to its peak in 
2005-06. 
The increase in house prices fed on itself through a number of 
mechanisms before the bubble eventually burst. According to Taylor,
With housing prices rising rapidly, delinquency and foreclosure rates 
on subprime mortgages also fell, which led to more favorable credit 
ratings than could ultimately be sustained. As the short-term interest 
rate returned to normal levels, housing demand rapidly fell, bring-
ing down both construction and housing price inflation. Delinquency 
and foreclosure rates then rose sharply, ultimately leading to the melt-
down in the subprime market and on all securities that were derivative 
from the subprimes (Taylor 2007, p. 465).
To establish the effect of low policy rates on housing, Taylor simu-
lated a simple model of housing starts in which the federal funds rate 
was the explanatory variable. The simulations assumed two alternative 
paths for the funds rate—the path that the funds rate actually followed 
and an alternative path in which the funds rate followed a Taylor rule. 
While the actual funds rate fell from 2 percent in 2002 to 1 percent in 
2003 before gradually rising to 5 ¼ percent in 2006, the funds rate in 
the alternative path rose steadily from 2 percent in 2002 to 5 ¼ percent 
in 2005. Taylor showed that the housing boom would have been less 
excessive in terms of housing starts had the federal funds rate followed 
the path prescribed by the Taylor rule instead of its actual path. In ad-
dition, he suggested the subsequent collapse of housing activity would 
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Taylor’s views are not universally held, however. Most prominently, 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke argued in an address to the 
American Economic Association that a low target federal funds rate 
from 2003 to 2006 had only a small impact on housing activity and 
prices.12 Bernanke based his view, in part, on a relatively simple statisti-
cal model that incorporated seven variables—including measures of eco-
nomic growth, inflation, unemployment, residential investment, house 
prices, and the federal funds rate—estimated with data from 1977 to 
2002. Based on this model, the actual behavior of the funds rate from 
2003 to 2008 was well within historical norms. However, despite the 
model’s ability to explain the behavior of the funds rate, and taking the 
actual behavior of the funds rate into account, the model could explain 
only a small part of the increase in house prices.13 Bernanke concluded 
that although the behavior of the funds rate was well within historical 
norms based on actual macroeconomic conditions, the rise in house 
prices was “well outside the predictions of the model” (p.14). The im-
plication was that some other factor drove up house prices. 
Bernanke also presented international evidence on the relationship 
between monetary policy and house prices. He showed that a number of 
other countries that experienced greater inflation-adjusted house price 
appreciation than the United States from 2002:Q1 to 2006:Q3 ran less 
accommodative monetary policies, as measured by Taylor rule devia-
tions, than the Federal Reserve.14 Moreover, the statistical relationship 
between house price appreciation and the stance of monetary policy was 
quite weak, and monetary policy differences across countries explained 
only about 5 percent of the variation in house price appreciation.
Bernanke argued that instead of monetary policy, the boom in 
housing prices in the industrial countries is explained by a global sav-
ings glut. “[C]apital inflows from emerging markets to industrial coun-
tries can help to explain asset price appreciation and low long-term real 
interest rates in the countries receiving the funds…” (p. 18).15 Bolster-
ing this global savings glut hypothesis is a strong statistical relationship 
across countries between the deterioration in a country’s current ac-
count balance as a percent of GDP from 2001:Q4 to 2006:Q3 and the 
associated increase in real house prices.76  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Leverage
Economists have also argued that a low interest rate environment 
may have contributed to an unsustainable buildup of leverage among 
financial and nonfinancial businesses. For example, Adrian and Shin 
present evidence that leverage of financial institutions is procyclical, 
meaning that these institutions increase their leverage in boom times 
and reduce it in downturns. Moreover, these institutions adjust their le-
verage by collateralized borrowing and lending in the market for repur-
chase and reverse-repurchase agreements. In the “repo” market a firm 
borrows funds using securities as collateral. In the “reverse repo” market 
a firm lends funds against securities as collateral. 
Liquidity—defined by Adrian and Shin as the growth rate of finan-
cial intermediaries’ balance sheets—amplifies the credit cycle. “When 
monetary policy is ‘loose’ relative to macroeconomic fundamentals, fi-
nancial institutions expand their balance sheets through collateralized 
borrowing; as a consequence, the supply of liquidity increases. Con-
versely, when monetary policy is ‘tight,’ institutions shrink their balance 
sheets, reducing the stock of repos and the overall supply of liquidity” 
(p. 2). The effect is more pronounced at security broker/dealers, whose 
assets are largely marketable short-term claims that are marked to mar-
ket, than at bank holding companies whose assets are largely loans car-
ried at book value. 
Adrian and Shin suggest that the policy rate, which directly affects 
the cost of leverage, “may be an important determinant of the expan-
sion and contraction of balance sheets and the liquidity of the financial 
system” (p. 7). By implication, holding the policy rate “too low for too 
long” risks an unsustainable buildup of leverage at financial institutions, 
in general, and at broker/dealers in particular.16 As shown in Chart 4, 
growth in debt held by financial institutions was rapid from the late 
1980s—especially from 1998 to 2000—up until the recent recession.17 
Moreover, the importance of balance sheet developments for economic 
activity is apparent in the lead-up to, and aftermath of, the 2007-08 
global financial crisis. As also shown in Chart 4, leverage of securities 
broker/dealers—defined as the ratio of total financial assets to total fi-
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erating pace from 2003 to 2007, when the federal funds rate fell below 
the prescriptions of the Taylor rule. As the U.S. economy fell into a 
deep recession in late 2007, firms began to rapidly shrink their balance 
sheets and deleverage. Leverage ratios fell precipitously. 
Commodities
The commodity market has also experienced considerable volatility 
in the last few years. This volatility may be another symptom of financial 
imbalances. James Hamilton, citing research by Tang and Xiong, has 
noted that since 2004 investors have made greater use of commodities 
as a hedge against rising inflation and a possible depreciation of the dol-
lar. Moreover, because an increase in commodity prices, especially oil 
prices, is often associated with a slowdown in economic activity, com-
modities might also represent a hedge against declining equity prices. 
He notes that the incentive to hoard commodities as an investment is 
particularly strong when interest rates are low (www.econobrowser.com/
archives/2009/11/commodity_infla.html). 
Chart 5 shows the behavior of an index of commodity prices and 
the spot price of oil since 1987. From 2002 to 2007, crude oil prices 
rose from under $25 per barrel to roughly $120 per barrel. Over the 
same period, the Commodity Research Bureau’s raw industrial price 
index increased roughly 133 percent. While the low interest rate en-
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vironment is one possible factor explaining these developments, other 
possible contributing factors include rising global demand for com-
modities—particularly from Asia—and the depreciation of the foreign 
exchange value of the dollar.
III.	 TAYLOR	 RULE	 DEVIATIONS	 AND	 FINANCIAL	 IM-
BALANCES:	EVIDENCE
Clearly, interest rates are an important factor in explaining econom-
ic and financial developments. Low interest rates stimulate economic 
activity and encourage borrowing. If interest rates are kept too low for 
too long, inflation is ultimately the result. But can other problems arise 
from a low interest rate environment, even if inflation appears subdued 
and is expected to remain subdued? This section examines evidence on 
the relationship between persistently low policy rates—as measured by 
Taylor rule deviations—and the various measures of financial condi-
tions examined in the previous section. The evidence is derived from 
examining the correlation and lead-lag relationships between Taylor 
rule deviations and financial conditions from 1987 to 2009—a period 
of relatively low and stable inflation.
Chart 5
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Correlations
A starting point for the analysis is the correlation between Taylor rule 
deviations and measures of financial conditions. Chart 6 shows scatter 
plots of four measures of financial conditions against deviations from 
Taylor Rule 1 as defined in the first section.18 The horizontal axes show 
deviations from the Taylor rule, where a negative number means that the 
actual funds rate fell below the prescription of the Taylor rule. The verti-
cal axes show changes in the S&P tech stock price index in panel A, the 
house price-to-rent ratio in panel B, the broker-dealer leverage ratio in 
panel C, and changes in the commodity price index in panel D.19 In each 
panel of the chart, a regression line is drawn showing the overall relation-
ship between financial conditions and Taylor rule deviations.
The regression lines show inverse relationships between Taylor rule 
deviations and three of the four measures of financial conditions—the 
house price-to-rent ratio, the leverage ratio, and commodity price infla-
tion. Thus, in these cases, the farther the funds rate falls below the Tay-
lor rule prescription, the greater the indicator of financial imbalance. 
However, the strength of the relationship is mixed. It is statistically 
significant as determined by the t-statistic on the slope coefficient on 
the Taylor rule deviation for the house price-to-rent ratio and the lever-
age ratio, but insignificant for commodity price inflation.20 Moreover, 
the relationship between tech-stock prices and Taylor rule deviations is 
positive and significant rather than inverse. Overall, this evidence sug-
gests that Taylor rule deviations have somewhat variable explanatory 
power across the financial indicators examined. 
Lead/lag relationships
While  the  evidence  supporting  a  contemporaneous  correlation 
between various measures of financial condition and Taylor rule de-
viations is mixed, a more complicated dynamic relationship may be 
at work. In fact, most of the “stories” blaming financial imbalances on 
interest rates being “too low” also assert that they were too low for “too 
long.” Thus, the level of interest rates several quarters ago may help 
predict the extent of a financial imbalance today. 
To determine these lead/lag relationships, an atheoretical statisti-
cal model was estimated consisting of two equations—one describ-
ing various financial conditions and the other describing Taylor rule 80  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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deviations. The financial conditions equation took the following form: 




1 Σ Σ Σ , ,   j j j k t j t c TRDEV e = − + 1
4
1 1 , ,,     (1)
where Ait is the asset price or financial indicator i in quarter t; TRk,t-j is 
the prescription of Taylor Rule k in quarter t-j; TRDEVk,t-j is the devia-
tion of the federal funds rate from the prescription of Taylor Rule k in 
quarter t-j; and Constant1, a1j, b1j , and c1j are parameters to be estimated. 
Finally, e1t represents the regression residual. A second equation, which 
is described in Appendix 2, is estimated to determine whether financial 
indicators help predict Taylor rule deviations.
Both the Taylor rule prescription and its deviation are included in 
the financial imbalances equation to distinguish between the effects of 
interest rate changes that are prescribed by the Taylor rule from interest 
rate changes that deviate from the rule. The key test is whether the coef-
ficients on TRDEVk,t-j are jointly statistically significant. In this sense, 
the test determines whether Taylor rule deviations affected asset prices 
and other financial indicators.
In estimating the model, a variety of measures of Taylor rule devia-
tions and financial variables are used. For Taylor rule deviations, the 
equations are estimated for each of the four Taylor rules specified in the 
first section. In addition, the deviations themselves are calculated in a 
number of different ways. First, as originally defined, they are calculated 
as the simple difference between the actual federal funds rate target and 
the prescription of each of the four Taylor rules (TRDEV1 to TRDEV4 ). 
Second, the simple deviations are squared (TRDEVSQi), allowing for 
the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between Taylor rule devia-
tions and financial conditions; that is, the possibility that large devia-
tions are much more important determinants of financial imbalances 
than small deviations. And third, the simple Taylor rule deviations are 
cumulated over time so that the Taylor rule deviation in period t is 
equal to the sum of Taylor rule deviations from the first period up to 
period t (TRSUMi). The purpose of this variation is to capture the idea 
that the cumulative effect of low interest rates over time drives financial 
imbalances.21
A number of variables are considered as indicators of financial im-
balances. For the housing sector, these include prices as measured by the 
FHFA home price index and the home price-to-rent ratio. Stock price 
measures include the S&P 500 stock price index, the S&P high-tech 82  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
stock index, and the price-earnings ratio. Measures of leverage include 
total debt of financial institutions, the ratio of total financial assets to 
total financial equity for security dealers, and the ratio of total assets to 
total stockholders’ equity at the five largest investment banks before the 
collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. Commodity prices in-
clude the Commodity Research Bureau’s (CRB) index of raw industrial 
commodities and the spot price of crude oil.22   
Table 2 shows the results from regressions of the various measures 
of financial imbalances on lagged values of financial imbalances, lagged 
values of Taylor Rule 1 prescriptions, and lagged values of Taylor Rule 
1 deviations (TRDEV1) as in equation 1. Entries in the table indicate 
whether the coefficients on the lagged Taylor Rule deviations are jointly 
significantly different from zero and, therefore, help predict the various 
measures of financial imbalance. A “yes” entry indicates rejection of the 
hypothesis that a Taylor rule deviation does not help predict a financial 
imbalance at either the 1, 5, or 10 percent significance level. Appendix 
3 shows corresponding results for Taylor rules 2 to 4.
Results are mixed. All three variants of the Taylor rule 1 deviations 
helped predict home price growth and the home price-to-rent ratio. 
Two of the three variants helped predict the change in the S&P 500 
stock-price index, the stock price/earnings ratio, growth in SEC lever-
age, growth in financial debt, and growth in commodity prices. Taylor 
rule deviations were less consistently helpful in predicting the other 
financial variables; and, in the case of tech stock prices, none of the 
Taylor rule deviations were statistically significant. The tech stock bub-
ble—confined as it was to the one narrow sector—may have been more 
about euphoria over the Internet and other technological developments 
than a low interest rate environment. 
Economic significance
While evidence suggests that financial conditions are statistically 
related to Taylor rule deviations, the economic significance of this rela-
tionship is less clear.23 One approach to examining the economic sig-
nificance of the relationship is to use the estimated parameters from 
equation 1 to predict financial conditions under two scenarios. In one 
scenario, the estimated equation is forecast with the actual Taylor rule 
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other scenario, the Taylor rule deviations are set equal to zero. The dif-
ference in the two forecasts and their ability to “predict” the actual path 
of the various financial variables provide an indication of the contribu-
tion Taylor rule deviations make in explaining financial conditions. The 
forecasts are dynamic in the sense that forecasts of the financial variables 
are plugged back into the right-hand side instead of actual values.    
Chart 7 shows the results of the exercise for a sample of four finan-
cial indicators (the same ones as in the previous chart). The dynamic 
forecasts begin in 1997:Q1 and run through the end of the sample in 
2009:Q4. The blue lines show the actual path of the S&P tech stock 
price index in panel A, the house price-to-rent ratio in panel B, the le-
verage ratio in panel C, and the commodity price index in panel D. The 
grey line shows the forecasts of these variables based on equation 1 with 
lags of both the actual Taylor rule prescriptions and the Taylor Rule 1 
deviations included on the right-hand side.24 The black line shows the 
forecasts when the Taylor rule deviations are set equal to zero through-
out the forecast period.25 
As in the earlier analysis, results are mixed.26 In the case of the tech-
stock price index, the inclusion of the Taylor rule deviations contributes 
very little to the forecast accuracy of the equation. In contrast, the Taylor 
rule deviations contribute considerably more to the forecast of the home 
price-to-rent ratio. In fact, the forecast based on both the lagged Taylor 
rule prescriptions and deviations tracks the upward movement in the ra-
tio relatively closely, albeit with a lag. In addition, it tracks to a consider-
able degree the extent of the upward movement in house prices relative to 
rent. When the Taylor rule deviations are excluded from the forecasting 
equation, the bubble in housing prices looks more like a bump. 
With respect to the leverage ratio, the equation including the lagged 
Taylor rule deviations appears to more closely track the path of leverage 
from 2001 to roughly 2006 than the equation excluding the deviations, 
but less closely from 2007 to 2009. Finally, with respect to commodity 
prices, neither specification does particularly well, although the equa-
tion including lagged deviations captures at least part of the upward 
movement in commodity prices from 2003 to 2007 as well as their 
subsequent fall. 
In sum, evidence provides support for an economically meaning-
ful effect of Taylor rule deviations on financial conditions in some sec-ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  85
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tors but not in others. Of course, in each market, numerous special 
factors beside short-term policy rates are at work influencing financial   
conditions, and the empirical approach taken in this article is a vast 
simplification. For example, as suggested earlier, long-term rates play a 
key role in each of these sectors. And their behavior was unusual during 
2004-06 when, by historical standards, they increased very little despite 
the FOMC’s increase in the target federal funds rate from 1 percent to 
5.25 percent.27 Taking account of this behavior may be necessary to 
explain any imbalances that may have been building during this period. 
In addition, the one-off nature of many of the financial imbalances, 
particularly the tech-stock price bubble in 1998-2000 and the com-
modity price surge in 2006-07, may be difficult to explain econometri-
cally. In particular, without multiple observations of a phenomenon, it 
is difficult to rule out alternative explanations. 
An additional complication is that, to the extent Taylor rule devia-
tions preceded financial imbalances, the symptoms of the imbalances 
appeared at different times in different sectors. For example, the fact 
that a period of low policy rates may have engendered a tech-stock price 
bubble in one instance and a housing bubble in another makes it dif-
ficult to find a statistical relationship between low rates and any particu-
lar financial imbalance. In light of these difficulties and the simplicity of 
the empirical approach in this article, it is perhaps surprising that any 
statistically significant relationships would emerge between Taylor rule 
deviations and financial imbalances.     
IV.	 CONCLUSIONS
The global economy has been buffeted by a number of financial 
crises over the last 25 years. The U.S. economy appeared to be relatively 
well-insulated from these crises until the U.S. housing bubble burst, 
leading to the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. 
While the causes of the 2007-08 global financial crisis will undoubt-
edly be debated for decades to come, some economists have suggested 
that Federal Reserve monetary policy contributed to a buildup of fi-
nancial imbalances that ultimately precipitated the crash. In particular, 
by keeping short-term interest rates too low for too long, policymakers 
may have fostered the emergence of a housing price bubble. In addi-
tion, low interest rates encouraged private investors to increase leverage ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  87
and invest in risky assets in pursuit of higher returns. When the hous-
ing bubble burst, the financial system nearly collapsed.
Other  economists  argue  that  monetary  policy  was  appropriate 
given economic fundamentals and that other factors were more impor-
tant in precipitating the crisis. For example, a global savings glut may 
have led to growing demands for relatively safe U.S. assets, keeping 
long-term interest rates low. Moreover, detecting and leaning against 
growing financial imbalances may be difficult or impossible to do in 
real time. Still, the question remains whether a monetary policy that 
successfully stabilized inflation contributed to a buildup of financial 
imbalances by maintaining short-term interest rates at very low levels 
for prolonged periods of time. 
To  address  this  question,  this  article  examined  the  relationship 
between short-term interest rates and a variety of financial indicators 
designed to capture growing imbalances. While individually these in-
dicators may contain limited information, collectively they potentially 
provide insight into whether low short-term interest rates contributed 
to a buildup of financial imbalances. Interest rates were considered “too 
low” if they deviated from the prescriptions of various versions of the 
Taylor rule. Because a variety of Taylor rules have been proposed in the 
literature, the analysis considered a variety of Taylor rule specifications. 
The article concludes that, while there appears to be a statistically 
significant relationship between Taylor rule deviations and a number of 
financial indicators, their economic significance is mixed. With 20/20 
hindsight, lagged Taylor rule deviations appear to help predict the housing 
bubble and, to a lesser extent, commodity price movements. Taylor rule 
deviations are much less useful in explaining the bubble in tech-stocks or 
the rise in broker/dealer leverage. A key challenge in finding a robust re-
lationship between Taylor rule deviations and financial imbalances is that 
the imbalances appeared in different sectors at different times. 
Even so, the evidence suggests that policymakers should monitor 
financial conditions for signs that imbalances are building. These imbal-
ances may indicate that interest rates are too low even when real-time 
inflation and output data suggest low rates are warranted. Moreover, 
policymakers should be cautious in deliberately maintaining rates be-
low Taylor rule prescriptions. Although policymakers may have many 
reasons to deviate from simple rule-like behavior, they should be alert to 




The prescription of the Taylor rule depends not only on the 
chosen parameters of the rule but also importantly on the measure 
of inflation.28 In his original 1993 specification, Taylor measured 
inflation with the GDP deflator. Given the data available at the 
time, his specification closely tracked the FOMC’s funds rate target 
from 1987 to 1993. Since the time Taylor proposed his rule, data 
on the GDP deflator have been revised. Taylor rule prescriptions 
using the latest vintage data on inflation as measured by the GDP 
deflator no longer track the funds rate target as closely as Taylor 
rule prescriptions using early 1990s vintage data. As a result, an 
alternative inflation measure was used in this article.
Chart A1 shows the historical prescriptions from Taylor rule 
1 using 5 different measures of inflation—the GDP deflator, the 
consumer price index (CPI), the consumer price index net of food 
and energy prices (core CPI), the personal consumption expendi-
ture (PCE) price index, and the PCE price index net of food and 
energy (core PCE price index).29 The top panel of the chart shows 
the envelope of Taylor rule prescriptions with the alternative infla-
tion measures relative to the actual path of the funds rate target. 
The bottom panel shows deviations of the actual funds rate from 
the Taylor rule prescriptions. While there is considerable variation 
in the prescriptions of the various Taylor rule specifications, they all 
track the actual path of the funds rate fairly closely—except from 
2002 to 2006 when the actual funds rate fell persistently below the 
prescriptions of all of the Taylor rule specifications. 
Over the period that Taylor examined—1987 to 1993—and 
through 1997, Taylor rule prescriptions based on the most recent, 
revised data for the GDP deflator deviate more from the actual path 
of the funds rate than Taylor rule prescriptions based on alternative 
measures of inflation. This suggests that an alternative measure of 
inflation is needed to track the funds rate as well as a Taylor rule 
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The analysis in this article uses Taylor rules with the CPI as the 
measure of inflation. Using CPI inflation in Taylor rule 1 results in 
smaller deviations from 1987 to 1997 than Taylor rules using al-
ternative measures of inflation. In particular, the root mean square 
error of the deviations from the Taylor rule using CPI inflation over 
this period was smaller than for other inflation measures. 
PANEL B
TAYLOR RULE 1 DEVIATIONS WITH ALTERNATIVE 
INFLATION MEASURES  
PANEL A
TAYLOR RULE 1 PRESCRIPTIONS WITH ALTERNA-
TIVE INFLATION MEASURES  




Fully understanding the relationship between financial imbal-
ances and Taylor rule deviations requires not only understanding 
the effect of Taylor rule deviations on financial imbalances but also 
the reverse effect. In other words, do lagged financial conditions 
help predict Taylor rule deviations? To address this question, a sec-
ond equation was estimated that took the following form:




2 Σ Σ , , , , t j t e − + 2 (2)
where Constant2, a2j, and c2j  are parameters to be estimated and e2t   
is the residual term.30 
According  to  the Taylor  rule,  policymakers  should  respond 
directly only to deviations in inflation from target and real GDP 
from potential GDP. Evidence that the coefficients on lagged fi-
nancial variables (a2j) are jointly statistically significant might sug-
gest that policymakers responded directly to financial conditions in 
setting policy rates. In this case, an estimated correlation between 
Taylor rule deviations and measures of financial imbalances may 
simply reflect the fact that financial conditions influenced the set-
ting of the policy rate, not necessarily that Taylor rule deviations 
contributed to a buildup of financial imbalances. 
Table A1 examines whether financial conditions help predict 
Taylor rule 1 deviations. Results for other Taylor rule specifications 
are shown in Appendix 3. Entries in the table, based on estimates 
of equation 2, indicate whether coefficients on the lagged financial 
conditions indicators are jointly significantly different from zero 
and, therefore, help predict the various measures of Taylor Rule 1 
deviations. A “yes” entry indicates rejection of the hypothesis that 
a financial indicator does not help predict a Taylor rule deviation 
at the 1, 5, or 10 percent significance level. Here, the results ap-
pear more systematic across the sectors examined. The house price 
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deviations, while stock prices and leverage generally do not. This 
suggests that policymakers did not respond directly to stock mar-
ket developments or leverage. However, policymakers did appear 
to respond to developments with housing prices and commodity 
prices—perhaps because they provided information about future 
inflation or real output that was not contained in the current infla-
tion rate or real output gap.31
In summary, looking at the relationships from both directions, 
house prices and Taylor rule deviations generally appear to be joint-
ly determined in that lags of each help predict the other. Similarly, 
commodity prices and Taylor rule deviations generally appear to 
be jointly determined. In contrast, Taylor rule deviations generally 
help predict stock prices and leverage, but stock prices and leverage 
do not generally help predict Taylor rule deviations. Thus, there 
is some evidence that Taylor rule deviations contribute in varying 
degrees to financial developments in all of the sectors examined, 
but less evidence that stock prices and leverage contribute to Taylor 
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ENDNOTES
1Taylor (1993) suggests the oil price shock following the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 was one such example.
2See Taylor (2008) for a discussion of the costs and benefits of deviating from 
rule-like behavior.
3In addition, a fifth rule was considered that was specified in first differences. 
In particular, the rule prescribed a change in the funds rate target based on the 
deviation of inflation from target and the change in the output gap. As in Rule 1, 
the weights on inflation and output were both set equal to 0.5. The advantage of 
the difference rule is that it does not depend on an estimate of the equilibrium real 
rate or the level of the output gap. When Rule 1 is expressed in first differences, 
the equilibrium real rate—which is assumed constant—drops out, and the output 
gap is replaced with its growth rate—which can arguably be estimated more ac-
curately than the level of the output gap. Taylor (1993) suggested the possibility 
of a rule based on output growth. Orphanides specified such a rule and examined 
historical monetary policy using a difference rule, among others. The policy pre-
scription from the first difference rule tracks the actual path of the funds rate more 
closely than the other rules because it depends, in part, on the actual level of the 
funds rate in the previous period. The first difference rule may have appeal in real 
time policymaking because it can be implemented without a prior estimate of the 
equilibrium real funds rate or the level of the output gap. 
4Taylor (1993) used the GDP deflator as his measure of inflation and de-
viations of real GDP from a trend line as his measure of the output gap. Based 
on his 1993 rule and the latest vintage data available to Taylor at the time, the 
prescription of the rule closely matched the actual path of the federal funds rate 
from 1987 to 1992. 
5The latest vintage data on the output gap differs from the real-time data 
policymakers had available at the time policy decisions were made. Because the 
CPI data are essentially not revised, the latest vintage data is the same as the data 
policymakers had in real time. This article uses latest vintage data rather than 
real-time data. The purpose is to assess the ex post impact of monetary policy on 
financial imbalances, not to evaluate whether policy was optimal given informa-
tion available at the time policy decisions were made.
6The degree and persistence of the Taylor rule deviations over this period are 
reduced somewhat when core measures of inflation are used in the Taylor rule. 
7Varying the parameters and inflation and output gap measures in the Taylor 
rule can produce a fairly wide range of prescriptions as Kozicki shows. Neverthe-
less, as Dokko, et al. show, the actual path of the funds rate falls below a wide 
range of Taylor rule prescriptions from 2003 to 2004. 
8FOMC Statement, September 1998. See Blinder and Reis for further discus-
sion of this episode. 96  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
9Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marqués-Ibáñez examine the relationship be-
tween low interest rates and bank risk-taking. The next section discusses asset 
prices, leverage, and commodity prices.
10Other indexes of house prices, such as the S&P/Case-Shiller index, showed 
an even sharper boom-and-bust cycle.
11The rent a homeowner could receive by leasing his or her house is a fun-
damental determinant of the value of the house. When house prices are high 
relative to rent, future increases in house prices are more likely to be small. Thus, 
the price-rent ratio can be viewed as “an indicator of valuation in the housing 
market” (Gallin, p. 635).
12See also Del Negro and Otrok; Jarociński and Smets; Edge, Kiley, and La-
forte; and Iacoviello and Neri. 
13Bernanke refers to Dokko and others (2009) for details.
14Despite some countries having less-accommodative policies than the Unit-
ed States, essentially all of the 20 countries examined in Bernanke’s sample had 
policy rates less than prescribed by the Taylor rule. 
15See Bernanke (2007) for details.
16Adrian and Shin present evidence that, when Taylor rule deviations are 
negative, meaning that the federal funds rate is below the prescription of a Taylor 
rule, the growth rate of repos is higher than average (p. 6).
17Debt held by financial institutions “increasingly overstates the amount of 
borrowing associated with economic activity because a growing share of this total 
debt comprises claims issued by financial intermediaries jut to fund other debt” 
(Samolyk, p. 35). This measurement issue is not addressed in this article and   
could conceivably affect the results.
18Results are similar for deviations from Taylor rules 2-4.
19Financial  indicator  growth  rates  are  calculated  as  four-quarter  rates  of 
change, and Taylor rule prescriptions are calculated with inflation measured by 
the four-quarter rate of change in the CPI.
20T-statistics are corrected for serial correlation using the Newey-West covari-
ance matrix.
21Other variations were also considered. Reflecting the possibility that only 
negative deviations matter for financial imbalances (interest rates too low for too 
long, not too high for too long), deviations that are greater than zero were set 
equal to zero. In addition, the measure of strictly negative deviations was squared 
to allow for nonlinearity in the relationship. Results are qualitatively the same for 
these alternative measures.   
22All of the variables except the house price-to-rent ratio were measured as 
annualized one-quarter rates of change. Other financial variables were also con-
sidered—including restricting growth in the S&P Case-Shiller national home 
price index to observations in excess of one standard deviation; growth in the 
S&P Case-Shiller index for Las Vegas, Phoenix, and San Diego; the share of ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  97
employment in the construction sector; S&P 500 stock price changes in excess 
of one standard deviation; stock price volatility as measured by the VIX; and   
nonfinancial debt growth. 
23For example, while the coefficients on lagged Taylor rule deviations in equa-
tion 1 are, in many cases, jointly significantly different from zero, their sum is 
often insignificantly different from zero and sometimes carries the “wrong” sign. 
Moreover, plots of impulse response functions showing the effect of a shock to the 
Taylor rule deviation on financial conditions exhibit wide confidence bands that 
often  indicate no statistically significant effect. 
24Results for Taylor rule 2-4 deviations are similar.
25While the financial variables are generally specified as annualized one-quar-
ter growth rates and forecast accordingly, the charts show the variables and fore-
casts converted back into levels. 
26Results are sensitive to the estimation period and, in particular, depend on 
the inclusion of data from the post-2005 period.
27Then-Chairman Greenspan referred to this behavior as a “conundrum.”   
See Backus and Wright for a discussion of possible causes.
28The choice of parameters and the inflation measure are, however, inter-
twined. Because some measures of inflation are persistently above or below others, 
they imply different values for the equilibrium real interest rate. For example, 
inflation measured with the CPI was consistently higher than inflation measured 
by the GDP deflator from 1987 to 2001. Thus, for a given average nominal funds 
rate over this period, the average ex post real rate would be lower as measured 
by the CPI inflation rate than as measured by inflation in the GDP deflator. See 
Kozicki for a detailed analysis of this issue. 
29Other possible inflation measures, not considered here, are various fore-
casts of inflation. Evidence suggests that Taylor rules using (real time) forecasts of 
(PCE) price inflation lead to smaller Taylor rule deviations than Taylor rules using 
CPI inflation as currently measured (Bernanke).  
30The error terms, e1t and e2t , are assumed to have zero mean and finite variance. 
31If policymakers use a forward-looking framework in setting policy rates, 
variables that help forecast future inflation and output should help explain devia-
tions in the policy rate from a Taylor rule based on current inflation and output.98  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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